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We revisit the issue of independent monetary policies and macroe-
conomic interdependence between two economies acting to ﬁxt h e i r
exchange rate. This paper builds upon the ’new open-economy
macroeconomics’ (NOEM) literature and can be seen as a ﬁxed
exchange rate variant of the seminal Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)
exchange rate dynamics paper. The paper constructs a ﬁxed ex-
change rate model in the spirit of Mundell’s two country model–see
Mundell (1968, Chapter 18)–in which the money supply in each
country is endogenously determined under perfect capital mobility
following an attempt at a unilateral credit expansion. Unlike the tra-
ditional approach however, since the model is derived from intertem-
poral optimisation, we are able to analyse the long-run stock impli-
cations of the equilibrating reserve ﬂows necessary to bring about
the short-run equilibrium. As with its ﬂexible exchange rate cousin,
the welfare results in this ﬁxed exchange rate model can be surpris-
ing, and stand in stark contrast to the implied spillovers in the early
ad hoc models.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
What are the linkages between economies ﬁxing their exchange rate? Absent
coordination between monetary policymakers, what are the spillovers across
regions of independent policy choices within a ﬁxed exchange rate regime? Un-
til recently, issues of macroeconomic interdependence in general, and ﬁxed ex-
change rates in particular, have relied upon variants of the workhorse Mundell-
Fleming model. In the two-country context, this is spelled out most clearly
in Mundell (1968), Mussa (1979) and Dornbusch (1980). However, advances
in modeling techniques and the need to provide these earlier ad hoc models
with fully articulated microfoundations has seen an outpouring of research in
the sphere of open-economy macroeconomics following the lead of the closed-
economy, new Keynesian approach exempliﬁed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
The seminal paper in this ’new open-economy macroeconomics’ (NOEM)
literature is the Redux paper of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995). This contribution
c a nb es u m m a r i s e da sf o l l o w s :
First, building on a monopolistically competitive market structure so as to
provide a justiﬁcation for explicit price setting behaviour and–under assumed
one-period nominal rigidities and since prices will be set above marginal cost–
demand determined output, monetary policy can have important welfare eﬀects
in the open economy as it pushes output away from the suboptimal decentralised
equilibrium. This much is familiar from the closed-economy new Keynesian
models.
Second, in the open-economy, with agents and the government obeying their
intertemporal budget constraints in making choices through time, the accumu-
lation of claims on the other region creates an important channel through which
the stock implications of equilibrating ﬂows in open economies can have long-
lasting eﬀects. Since Lucas’ inﬂuential critique (Lucas, 1976) the importance of
modeling individuals as acting in a forward looking and optimising manner is
clear, and the NOEM achieves this in the same way as the intertemporal ap-
proach to the current account of the late 1970s and early 1980s, however without
discarding the important earlier assumption of sticky prices.
Finally, with a model constructed from microeconomic foundations, the wel-
fare eﬀects of shocks can be explicitly considered. On the welfare front, within
their special model, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) were able demonstrate how
a monetary expansion and exchange rate depreciation could have a positive
welfare spillovers. Tille (2001) generalises this result, focussing on the role of
consuption substitutability, showing circumstances in which the positive welfare
spillover need not obtain.
Since this early contribution, the NOEM has moved at a fast pace. One
application has been to the issue of market segmentation and the possibility
of pricing-to-market behaviour by ﬁrms. In particular, local currency pricing
(LCP) by ﬁrms generates the empirically realistic scenario that there are signif-
icant deviations from the law of one price (LOOP) when the nominal exchange
rate changes. And one strong implication of LCP behaviour is that the exchange
rate need not play the expenditure switching role emphasised in the traditional
2literature. A number of studies have therefore concluded that, absent expen-
diture switching due to market segmentation and LCP, a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime can be preferable to a ﬂoat. However, recent NOEM models have been
somewhat vague about the question of foreign exchange market intervention and
the consequences for the central bank’s reserves.
In this paper, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is developed which addresses
the issue of central bank intervention. As in the traditional Mundell (1968)
two-country ﬁxed exchange rate model, the central banks simply commit to
buying and selling foreign exchange at a given ﬁxed rate. And as with Mundell,
following an attempted monetary expansion by either of the countries there is
a ﬂow of reserves between the central banks making the actual money supplies
endogenous. Unlike Mundell’s model however, our intertemporal framework
allows us to analyse the long run stock implications of these reserve ﬂows.
Although, with the exception of the common currency in Europe, ﬂoating
exchange rates have dominated the international monetary system since the
collapse of Bretton-Woods, there are important reasons to examine the issue of
macroeconomic interdependence in a ﬁxed exchange rate world. For example,
there has been constant unease with this ﬂoating experience. Despite the view
of Friedman (1953) that speculation in foreign exchange markets under ﬂoating
would be a stabilising force, the evidence from the last thirty years has been
vastly diﬀerent. The opinion that exchange rate behaviour cannot be explained
by fundamentals alone has been popular. For example Frankel and Froot (1986,
1990) advanced this view for the ﬁnal 20 percent or so of dollar appreciation
up until 1985. Their perspective, based on the possible dominance of ’chartist’
analysis in forex trading, is more closely associated with the view of the world
during the interwar documented by Nurkse (1944).
The 1980s experience caused many commentators to review the eﬃcacy of
ﬂexible exchange rates and call for a return to an international monetary sys-
tem based on more stable exchange rates. To take Krugman’s (1989, original
emphasis) perspective:
For most of my professional career, I believed that freely ﬂoat-
ing exchange rates represented the best system available... I have
now changed my mind... I am now an advocate of an eventual re-
turn to a system of more or less ﬁxed rates subject to discretionary
adjustment.
A more recent perspective also demonstrates discontent with exchange rate
behaviour, and has been associated with a move towards protectionism in the
United States. This was summarised by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul
O’Neill as he tried to explain to Congress early in 2002 what the dollar policy
should be: ”Since protectionist pressures in this country are mounting rapidly
as a result of the overstrong dollar, we should be encouraging the markets to
take the currency down.”2 Benign neglect has been causing real concern.
2As quoted in The Observer, Sunday 5 May 2002.
3If the solution to these concerns is to move towards a system of more rigid
rates of exchange, we should be prepared to dust oﬀ and reﬁne our models
of interdependence in a ﬁxed exchange rate world which were so inﬂuential
in the 1960s. Indeed, this paper’s main contribution is that we utilise the
current state-of-the-art in open economy macroeconomics to rigorously analyse
the case of spillovers in a symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate world. The paper can be
thought of as complementing Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (1995) Redux model and its
generalisation provided by Tille (2001). We develop an apparatus for thinking
about the symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate regime within the modern literature
on macroeconomic interdependence. The model takes explicit account of the
reserve ﬂows across countries committed to maintaining the ﬁx in the manner
of Mundell (1968). As per our discussion above, this not only ﬁlls a gap in the
NOEM literature, but also carries potentially strong implications for thinking
about future exchange rate arrangements.
The paper is organised as follows. The following section revisits Mundell’s
two-country model, providing some background for what follows. In Section 3
we set out the model, much of which will be familiar from the NOEM literature.
Section 4 contains most of the original contribution of this model as it spells
out the nature of monetary policy in the ﬁxed exchange rate setting. Section 5
solves the model in relative per capita terms before in Section 6 a diagrammatic
illustration of the model’s properties is employed. Section 7 then solves for the
per capita variables under the assumptions of nonsterilisation and sterilisation
by the monetary authorities of the region not attempting to expand its monetary
base. Finally, in Section 8 we consider the welfare spillovers in this model where
it will be seen that the long run net asset implications of short run equilibrating
reserve ﬂows generate results which contrast with the ﬂexible exchange rate
literature on spillovers within the NOEM framework. Section 9 oﬀers some
concluding remarks and thoughts on future extensions and improvements to
this work.
2 Mundell’s Two Country Model
Robert Mundell presented his analysis of the eﬀectiveness of monetary and ﬁscal
policy under a ﬁxed or a ﬂoating exchange rate regime in the early 1960s3.W e
consider here his results regarding international spillovers due to independent
monetary policies in a two-country symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate setting under
3Mundell (1968), Chapter 18–see especially the appendix where the two country case is
set out. This model is also examined in Dornbusch (1980), Chapter 10. In this verbal sketch,
we skim over the additional spillovers on country speciﬁc output through the trade balance
in these models. Mundell (2001) provides an interesting discussion of the early development
of the ”Mundell-Fleming” model by himself and Marcus Fleming at the IMF in the early
1960s–although, as he points out, many of these ideas were already in place before he arrived
at the Fund. In particular he notes how he extended his thinking to the two-country case
following ”a critical comment” published the year following his original 1963 small country
model.
4perfect capital mobility4.T h eﬁx is symmetric in the sense that each country
can unilaterally pursue their own monetary policy by manipulating the domestic
credit component of the central bank’s balance sheet. However, ultimately the
overall money supply is endogenously determined through changes in the central
bank’s reserves following ﬁnancial market portfolio reallocation5.Ak e yi n s i g h t
of this model in the two-country setting is that, unlike in the small country case
where monetary policy is entirely ineﬀective as a stabilisation device, a monetary
expansion by one country will result in a reduction in the world interest rate,
an increase in demand, and an expansion in output worldwide.
Consider a two country world consisting of Home and Foreign. A Home
monetary expansion involves open market operations whereby the central bank
purchases domestic securities by printing money. This demand for Home secu-
rities reduces their return, causing an incipient capital outﬂow. This portfolio
reallocation then puts pressure on the Home exchange rate to depreciate vis-
a-vis Foreign. Under its obligation to ﬁx the exchange rate the Home central
bank is committed to meeting this demand for Foreign currency and in doing so
runs down some of its reserves–in the process oﬀsetting some of the expansion
in the Home monetary base6.
The portfolio reallocation occurs instantaneously bringing the return on
Home and Foreign assets in line. Since the Home country is not a small player
in the world there is only a partial oﬀset of the monetary expansion at Home
due to a reserve loss. Instead the monetary base both at Home and in Foreign
expands, the interest rate falls worldwide, and the ensuing increase in aggregate
demand results in a positive spillover due to the monetary expansion in a ﬁxed
exchange rate world–output expands both at Home and in Foreign.
Whilst this is a familiar enough story, there are two points worth making
about the model which will prove important in what follows: First, the analysis
is very much short term, as acknowledged by Mundell7.T h e m o d e l m a k e s
use of reserves ﬂows as agents respond to arbitrage opportunities in a world
4Perfect capital mobility requires: (i) assets to be perfect substitutes and (ii) instantaneous
adjustment.
5Mundell’s model, as with this paper, ignores the problem associated with reserves held
by the central banks being ﬁnite. Essentially, we assume the central bank’s reserves are never
exhausted. Since our model will rely on linearisations applicable only for ”small” shocks, the
assumption that reserves will not be exhausted seems innocuous.
6Actually, there is much implicit in this analysis: (i) To begin with we restrict the central
bank’s credit expansion to require the bank only purchase Home securities. In reality they
can hold Foreign securities as part of their balance sheet. (ii) We are also supposing that
the Home central bank purchases the securities oﬀ Home agents who then reallocate their
portfolios to Foreign securities. In practise of course either Home or Foreign agents could
initially hold the domestic securities, and during the credit expansion it is the holders of these
original securitites–regardless of nationality–who undertake a portfolio reallocation. As we
shall see, however, the assumption implicit in this discussion that these asset holders are
Home residents facilitates comparison with the model developed later where initially the net
asset position across the countries is assumed to be zero. In this case, following the monetary
expansion, it is the Home residents who purchase Foreign securities.
7As Mundell (1968, p.271) writes: ”It should also be apparent that the analysis is short-run
in character and this neglects long-run consideration of changes in the capital stock and the
level of indebtedness.”
5of perfect capital mobility to bring about the expansion in Foreign monetary
base and subsequently output. However, it fails to take into account the stock
implications of the portfolio reallocation, and in this respect fails to provide
a suitable narrative of the long run impact of such portfolio adjustments by
private agents. Second, the model relies upon the central bank controlling the
monetary base through open market operations. This means the central bank
purchases government bonds held by the private sector by printing money. In
much of the NOEM literature however, since Ricardian equivalence holds, it is
assumed for simplicity that the government does not issue bonds.
In terms of what follows, the ﬁrst of these issues represents an opportunity:
In modelling a ﬁxed exchange rate world in a dynamic context can we account,
as in the ﬂexible exchange rate NOEM models, for both the short run and the
long run due to the portfolio reallocation by the private sector? The second of
these issues is a modeling challenge: Are we able to fully map the government’s
policy choices into a world where, due to Ricardian equivalence, we retain the
assumption that government bonds are not issued? With these preliminaries in
mind, we turn to the model itself.
3 The Model
In the following section preferences of the individual, the market structure of
the economy and the individual’s budget constraint are used to generate the
ﬁrst order conditions for optimisation.
3.1 Individual Preferences, the Budget Constraint and
Market Structure
3.1.1 Utility, Consumption Preferences and Demand
There is a continuum of yeoman-farmers on the unit interval in the world econ-
omy. These individuals, indexed by j ∈ [0,1], are divided into two countries,
Home and Foreign, where h ∈ [0,n] whilst f ∈ (n,1]. Each individual j’s utility,
shown in (1), is additively separable through time, increasing in consumption,
C(j), and real money balances,
M(j)
P
–which enter in logarithmic form–and
















An analogous utility function exists for a Foreign resident, with variables
distinguished using an asterisk. β is the discount factor, common to both coun-
tries, which can alternatively be replaced by 1
1+δ where δ > 0 i st h er a t eo ft i m e
6preference. κ is a parameter which can be interpreted as a shift factor on the
disutility of work eﬀort, or an inverse indicator of productivity. We focus upon
this speciﬁc utility function in order to dwell upon other aspects of the model–
such as a varying intratemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The
results are easily generalisable however.
Ct(j) is a consumption index which aggregates the consumption of goods
produced at Home and those produced by Foreign. We will allow for a very















where an identical expression exists for the consumption index of a foreign
consumer. This CES aggregator allows ρ > 0 to vary reﬂecting the within-period
substitution between the goods in consumption. When ρ < 1 the goods are
complements in consumption. The ρ =1case is the Cobb-Douglas formulation
made familiar in the NOEM literature by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), whilst the
case where ρ > 1 reﬂects the goods produced in each country being substitutes
where the limit ρ →∞obtains when the goods are perfect substitutes8.T h i s
form of consumption aggregator of course implies residents of Home and Foreign
have identical preferences over goods produced in each country. Thus, it does
not allow for the empirical realism of home bias in consumption or the existence
of nontraded goods9.T h e c o e ﬃcients on CH and CF in (2) will be seen to
provide a convenient way, together with the assumptions below, of ensuring
that the demand for each good is independent of the size of the country in
which the yeoman-farmer resides.
We assume that the law of one price (LOOP) holds in this model such that
each good will sell at the same price, regardless of the country in which it is being
consumed, after its price is converted to any given currency. Since LOOP ob-
tains, given our assumption of indentical preferences over consumption indexes,
purchasing power parity (PPP) will hold through time such that the consumer
price indexes will be equated when converted into a common currency. Further-
more, since we will not be considering the possibility of currency devaluation
in this model, without loss of generality we set the nominal exchange rate to
unity and consequently we can associate Home and Foreign goods prices as be-
ing identical in each country, PH,t = P∗
H,t, PF,t = P∗
F,t and therefore Pt = P∗
t
∀ t. As such we will drop the asterisk from the Foreign price index henceforth.
As usual, this does not imply the terms of trade are constant.
8In allowing for varying degrees of substitution between goods produced in each country
our results are comparable to those attained in Tille (2001) for the ﬂexible exchange rate
case. In a more general framework, whether the goods are complements or substitutes would
depend also upon the intertemporal elasticity of substitution which is set to unity here.
9We will also see that this speciﬁcation also carries implications for price level stability
under sterilisation by either of the monetary authorities. That is, sterilisation of the monetary
base does not imply price level stability.
7Given our assumptions, the consumption based price index for both Home
and Foreign, is deﬁned as the minimum nominal expenditure required to pur-
c h a s eo n eu n i to ft h ec o n s u m p t i o ni n d e x :
Pt(j)=
£
nPH,t(j)1−ρ +( 1− n)PF,t(j)1−ρ¤ 1
1−ρ (3)
The parameter ρ not only reﬂects the intratemporal elasticity of substitution,
but also reﬂects the price-elasticity of demand for each countrywide consumption
aggregator–e.g. CH,t–when the price is measured with respect to the price
index in (3).
The consumption indexes for each country’s overall product themselves ag-
gregate the consumption goods produced by the continuum of yeoman-farmers in
each region. These aggregates, in the by now familiar manner in the macroeco-
nomics literature, confer on each producer in the economy a degree of monopoly
power in the production of their particular good. That is, the parameter θ > 1





























As θ →∞the market structure becomes perfectly competitive. θ is also the
price elasticity of demand for each good when its price is measured relative to
the consumption based price index for the respective consumption index. The
























The coeﬃcients in the consumption aggregators in (4) are convenient in that
they have a counterpart in (2) which, as noted above, ensure that the demand
for each individual good be independent of the size of the country in which the
good is produced. Furthermore, from (5) we can associate the price index for
the good produced in each country as being equal to the price set by any one








































Using (4) we can calculate the demand for each individual Home good as
a function of overall consumption of the Home aggregator, and likewise for
Foreign, see Box A. By similar argument, using (2), the demand for the Home































Combining the equations in Boxes A and B, and aggregating over all indi-























t = nCt +( 1− n)C∗
t . Each yeoman-farmer takes into account
the above demand functions when price setting. However given that there are
inﬁnitely many producers in this economy, each takes the overall price index as
given–individually, the yeoman-farmer is too small to aﬀect the overall indexes.
3.1.2 The Individual’s Budget Constraint
There is a nominal bond, denominated in either currency, available in this
economy–denoted Bt. Holdings of the bond will reﬂect the net asset position
between the two regions in that the bond will be in zero net supply. At each mo-
ment individuals carry forward bonds and money–(1+it)Bt(j)+Mt−1(j)–to
which they add the nominal earnings on their product–pt(j)yt(j).O u to ft h i s
the individual must make a consumption decision, pay taxes (or accept a trans-
fer) and carry forward a new quantity of money and bonds–Mt(j)+Bt+1(j).
Mt(j)+Bt+1(j) ≤ (1 + it)Bt(j)+Mt−1(j)+pt(j)yt(j) − PtCt(j) − PtTt(j)
(7)
3.1.3 First Order Conditions
Solving for each individual’s optimisation by maximising (1) subject to (6) and
(7) gives us the usual ﬁrst order conditions. That is, rearranging the demand
equations (6) in p(j) for j ∈ [0,n] and substituting into the budget constraint (7)
w ec a no b t a i na ne x p r e s s i o nf o rCt(j) which, when used in the utility function
(1), gives us an unconstrained optimisation problem. The solution to which
yields for Home, and by eqivalent argument for Foreign, the following FOCs:
Box C: First order conditions










































These equations have the usual interpretations. The ﬁrst are the con-
sumption Euler equations which reﬂects the optimal intertemporal allocation
10of consumption for each country. The next line in Box C gives the money de-
mand equations which illustrate how, with this money-in-the-utility-function
approach, the demand for real balances is decreasing in the nominal interest
rate–the opportunity cost of holding money–and increasing in real consump-
tion. The ﬁnal expressions are the labour-leisure trade-oﬀs. Since individuals
derive disutility from putting forth eﬀort for production purposes, as consump-
tion increases output in the economy decreases as people substitute from con-
sumption into leisure–a normal good. Output increases with the price of the
product since output can then provide for more consumption and therefore util-
ity. Rearranging and using (6), they also demonstrate how the price of each
good is set as a mark up over the ratio of the marginal disutility to labour eﬀort
divided by the marginal utility of consumption.
4 Monetary Policy and the Symmetric Fixed
Exchange Rate
As discussed above, in the Mundell story holdings of government bonds by the
monetary authority constituted the domestic credit component of the central
bank balance sheet. It was through open market operations to alter the central
banks holdings of government securities that domestic credit was aﬀected, and
therefore the monetary base in the economy expanded or contracted. However,
in this class of deterministic NOEM models, Ricardian neutrality holds–and
the literature conveniently assumes that governments do not issue bonds.
Whilst one approach to resolve this problem would be to analyse a model
in which government debt matters–for example by developing an overlapping
generations structure–in the ﬁrst instance a useful exercise would be to see
whether a symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate model can still be developed within
the simpler framework in which bonds are not issued. There are two reasons for
this: (i) Such a model would be much more tractable, and hence would avoid
many further technical details and (ii) this model would then allow a more direct
comparison with the ﬁrst generation of the ’new open economy macroeconomics’
literature. It is to such a setting we now turn our attention10.
4.1 Deﬁnition of the Monetary Base
We assume that the monetary authorities in both regions hold some reserves
of the other regions’ currency–which they surely will in order to meet the
obligation to ﬁx the exchange rate–such that if M0
t represents the total amount
of domestic money issued by the Home central bank in per capita terms, and
if the Foreign central bank holds the amount of domestic currency R∗
t,a g a i n
in (Foreign) per capita terms, then total domestic currency in Home private
agents’ hands is by deﬁnition (and likewise for Foreign)
















Thus the per capita holdings of Home (Foreign) currency by domestic (For-
eign) residents is the total issue of that currency minus the holdings of Home
(Foreign) currency by the other central bank.
We now make use of the government budget constraint to consider the policy
options available within this framework.
4.2 The Government’s Budget Constraint
We deal throughout with the budget constraint of the ﬁscal and monetary pol-
icymakers together. This consolidated constraint relates the change in money
supply in any one period to nominal taxes and the change in reserve holdings
by the Home central bank. It is written as
Rt − Rt−1 − PtTt = M0
t − M0
t−1 (9)
An analogous expression holds for the Foreign central bank. Ignoring re-
serves in this expression we observe how this just gives the usual budget con-
straint whereby a monetary expansion results in a transfer (negative tax) to
Home individuals11. We use (9) to demonstrate the policy options available to
the consolidated government.
Suppose there is an increase in Home reserves though no change in taxes in
a given period. The reserve increase might be due to Home residents presenting
Foreign exchange at the central bank which they wish to exchange for Home
currency. The central bank must, under its obligation to ﬁx the exchange rate,
clearly exchange Foreign for Home currency. For the case where there is no
tax change, this budget constraint demonstrates how this increase in Rt must
by deﬁnition be met through increase in money issued by the Home central
bank. Thus, the increase in reserves is unsterilised in the sense that the central
bank allows this to occur through an increase in the monetary base. Whether
this actually increases the holdings of Home currency by private individuals
depends on the actions of the Foreign central bank also. However, through its
accumulation of reserves, there will be an increase in the currency issued by the
Home central bank.
There is another policy option however. Once again suppose the Foreign
central bank remains inactive under the same inﬂow of reserves described. The
Home central bank can sterilise the force acting towards the expansion in the
11See, for example, Obsfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, p.664).
12Home monetary base. Consider, for example, the central bank after it meets
the presentation of Foreign currency by private individuals–as it is obliged–
by exchanging it for the Home currency. The consolidated government also has
tax raising powers, and in order to sterilise the expansionary eﬀect of this on
the monetary base the central bank can increase taxes to oﬀset this increase.
This is equivalent to the consolidated government meeting this demand at the
doors of the central bank for Home currency, though simultaneously allowing
the taxman to extract currency holdings from these individuals in an equal and
oﬀsetting manner.
The consolidated government budget constraint therefore demonstrates the
range of policy options–sterilisation or nonsterilisation–open to governments
as being available in this setting, even without the existence of government
bonds. Consider the following identity familiar from the central bank’s balance
sheet
M0




The issue of currency by the Home central bank is equal to the sum of
’domestic credit’–which in usual terms this represents the securities purchased
by the central bank and sitting on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet–




t−1 − Rt−1 − PtTt]+Rt
This provides a useful comparison with the representation of the central
bank’s balance sheet in (10). The expression in square brackets plays, in some
sense, the role of ’domestic credit’. An issue of money by the Home central bank
can either be used to purchase reserves of the other currency or can be injected
into the economy by means of a tax cut which is equivalent, in this model, to a
’domestic credit’ expansion.
In the model we will be interested in the government acting to control the
variable Dt, given above in (10), through time. This will be the exogenous policy
instrument, and can be interpreted as a tax cut for the case of a domestic credit
expansion, or a tax increase for a credit contraction. However, as in Mundell
(1968), the reserves held by the central bank and the overall money supply
will be endogenously determined12. That is, given the ﬁxed exchange rate the
12Mundell (2001) discusses the development of thinking about monetary policy in the open
economy. In his early, ﬂexible exchange rate papers–for example Mundell (1961)–monetary
policy was associated with varying interest rates. But as Mundell (2001, p.224) recalls: ”Later,
however, when I made the assumption of perfect capital mobility, monetary policy had to be
redeﬁned and was correctly treated as an open market operation, or change in domestic credit.
The money supply is an endogenous variable under ﬁxed exchange rates.”
13government stands prepared to buy or sell foreign currency at a preannounced
price. Thus, even after acting upon the domestic credit term as given here,
the actual overall money supply in private hands will be determined by the net
eﬀect after Rt and R∗
t have been endogenously determined.
Together, (8) and (10), along with its Foreign analogue, imply that the per
capita holdings of currency by the respective agents of the Home and Foreign
countries is















These identities imply that domestic currency in Home private agents’ hands
is equal to the domestic credit term, Dt, plus the diﬀerence between the reserves
of Foreign currency held by the Home central bank, Rt, and those holdings by
the Foreign central bank of domestic currency reserves weighted to reﬂect per
capita terms, R∗
t. Likewise for Foreign. From these expressions we observe how
the act of satisfying a private demand to exchange currecies has a symmetric
eﬀect on money supplies. Consider the Home central bank as conducting an
expansionary monetary policy by injecting Home currency into the economy
through Dt–a transfer to private hands through their budget constraint (7).
If domestic residents are not content to hold this currency, equilibrium in the
money market cannot be achieved in the usual way under ﬂexible exchange
rates by a depreciation of the domestic currency, and instead individuals will
attempt to substitute away from holding this currency. In this model therefore,
under the obligation of the central bank to ﬁx the exchange rate, individuals can
exchange their currency one-for-one for Foreign at (either) central bank. Thus,
as part of the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t ea r r a n g e m e n te i t h e rt h eH o m ec e n t r a lb a n k
supplies this Foreign currency by running down its reserves, Rt,o rt h eF o r e i g n
central bank accumulates Home currency, R∗
t. Either way, the act of ﬁxing
the exchange rate by either central bank not only oﬀsets somewhat the total
holdings of Home currency in private hands, Mt, but also, absent sterilisation,
simultaneously expands the holdings of Foreign currency in the hands of Foreign
private agents13.
13A natural question at this point, and one to which we return below, is: If Home private
agents are exchanging this Home currency for Foreign, how is it we are cetain this currency
ﬁnds itself in the hands of Foreign agents? The answer is that since Foreign currency does not
enter the utility function of Home residents, these agents do not wish to hold this currency–
which is dominated by any interest bearing assets. In this sense, a domestic credit expansion
by the Home central bank will, say, result in an incipient outﬂow of reserves as domestic
agents, in an analogous manner to that described by Mundell (1968), exchange Home for
Foreign currency in order to alter their portfolio holdings in favour of Foreign interest bearing
assets. This will have the simultaneous symmetric eﬀect of expanding the Foreign monetary
base. We return to this later when we consider the balance of payments equations in this
model.
145S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
In this section we solve the model by employing the technique introduced by
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995). That is, since in general this class of models does
not yield an explicit closed form solution, we solve for an unanticipated shock to
the policy variables–domestic credit as controlled by the central banks–about
an initial symmetric steady-state. The most unique feature of this model is the
symmetric ﬁx. Thus, we spell out the solution to this lineariseation in close
detail. The more familiar aspects of this section are relegated to an appendix.
5.1 Linearised Money Demand
Into the money demand equations given in Box C we use our expression for the
individual’s holdings of nominal money (11):






























The symmetric steady-state about which we linearise, due to the additional
complications in the ﬁxed exchange rate model, will be slightly more restrictive
than the ﬂexible exchange rate version where the zero net asset assumption is
utilised. The initial symmetric steady-state for this model will be deﬁned as













(iii) B0 =0 . Together, (i) and (ii) imply that the initial per capita domestic
credit to reserves ratio of the central banks are identical, or that M0 = D0 and
M∗
0 = D∗
0. Alternatively, (i) suggests that the total reserves of a small economy
is identical to the total reserves of a large economy. Whilst this does not seem
entirely realistic, we utilise this assumption without apology since it will allow
us to solve the model.
Given condition (i), we can log-linearise14 the above money demand equa-
tions about the initial steady state:








































































Next, given (ii) we can conveniently rewrite these equations as









∗ − ψ = −
1
δ




where d = dDt










0 ,a n dr =
drt+1
δ etc. such
that we follow the convention that lower case letters reﬂect deviations from
their symmetric steady state and furthermore those lower case letters without
an overbar are the initial period deviation, while those with an overbar the
long run deviation. Note lower case variants of most upper case variables are
used except in the case of reserves–R and R∗–to which we assign the Greek
symbols ψ and ψ
∗ to avoid confusion with the real interest rate. As in Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1995) ,the economy reaches its long run steady state in the period
immediately after the shock, and consequently variables with an overbar count
as the second period and long run deviations from the initial symmetric steady-
state.





(c − c∗) −
1
2
(d − d∗) (12)
Equation (12) demonstrates how an increase in relative domestic credit, d−
d∗ > 0, can be accommodated for through two channels: Either as part of the
increase in relative consumption and therefore relative money demand which
might occur, given one-period rigidities, because of the monetary expansion or
16through the residents running down the relative reserve position of the central
banks, ψ − ψ
∗ < 0.
In practise both these eﬀects take place. Relative consumption will increase
if, given nominal rigidities, output expands following the monetary expansion.
At the same time, the relative reserve position will change as individuals bring
about money market equilibrium by reducing their money holdings. Whilst a
foray to the central bank to exchange unwanted money balances is an important
channel which brings about money market equilibrium, this is not the end of
the story. We now turn to the question of what happens to these reserves.
5.2 The Balance of Payments
As outlined above, when individuals are not prepared to hold any amount of a
domestic credit expansion, they have an outlet through which they can reduce
their holdings of domestic currency–by presenting it at the central bank and
exchanging it for the currency of the other region. However, as Foreign money
does not enter into the Home individual’s utility function and vice versa, there is
no incentive for the individual to hold this currency either–especially since this
money is strictly dominated by interest bearing assets. Consequently, Home
individuals have the option of using their excess liquidity to purchase bonds.
Consolidating the budget constraints (7) and (9), and using (8) we get the
balance of payments equation for the Home economy. An analogous expression
exists for Foreign. This expression gives the short run accumulation of assets
as the diﬀerence between the current account and changes in reserves in each
region, or alternatively
Bt+1 =( 1+it)Bt + pt(h)yt(h) − PtCt −
·










Observe how, beginning at the initial symmetric steady state deﬁned above,
the current (PHYH − PC) and capital (−B) accounts of the private sector,
when they do not sum to zero, must be oﬀset by a change in the oﬃcial reserve







t−1). Of course bonds




n B∗(j)dj = nB +(1−n)B∗ =0





B. Linearising (13) and its Foreign analogue about our
initial symmetric steady state and subtracting we get:
b
1 − n
=( yH − yF) − (c − c∗) − 2(e ψ − e ψ
∗
)
17where e ψ = dRt













0 . In order to make the balance of payments equations compatible
with (12) it is necessary to spell out the relation between the steady state about
which has been linearised. For this reason, consider the steady state money




















measure of ’inverse velocity’–and make use of the fact that within a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime there is no expenditure switching eﬀect such that (yH −
yF)=0 , we can use these expressions to substitute in above as:
b
1 − n
= −(c − c∗) − 2v(ψ − ψ
∗) (14)
This is now in terms of the deviations of reserves from the inital steady
state comparable with those in our linearised money demand equations. (14)
demonstrates how the net asset position of the countries is given by two terms.
The ﬁrst is the relative consumptions of the two regions, and represents the
current account channel in action. The second is the relative reserve position.
Thus in this model, unlike in the ﬂexible exchange rate models of, for example,
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), the net asset position following a shock does not
reﬂect the counterpart to the initial current account position alone, but also
the portfolio reallocation due to reserve ﬂows. This represents an important
departure from the ﬂexible exchange rate model which we will consider in more
detail later–and is an important improvement on the ad hoc macro models
of the 1960s which failed to spell out explicitly the constraints faced by the
economies and therefore the stock implications of equilibrating reserve ﬂows.
5.3 Connecting the Short- with the Long-Run
In order to solve the model we require an equation describing the long run
equilibrium of the model and an equation connecting this long run equilibrium
to the impact eﬀect of the shock as derived above. The former is obtained
by linearising both the labour leisure trade-oﬀ equations above and long run
18equilibrium conditions15, while the latter comes from the linearised consumption
Euler equations. Together, after some manipulation, we are able to write






This equation represents the fact that in the long run output is endogenous
in this model, and consequently for b>0 relative consumption would increase
b yl e s sw h e nt h eg o o d sa r es u b s t i t u t e s ,ρ > 1, as individuals substitute towards
leisure. As usual, the impact eﬀect on all relative variables is equal to the long
run value of their relative deviations from the symmetric steady state such that
ψ − ψ
∗ = ψ − ψ
∗
and c − c∗ = c − c∗ and also b = b.W ea r en o wi nap o s i t i o n
to think about the eﬀect of a credit shock in this model.
6 Diagrammatic Analysis of a Relative Credit
Shock
In order to provide some intuition for the results which will follow, we will
proceed by providing a diagrammatic analysis of a relative credit shock hitting
the economy. Equations (15), (16) and (17) represent three equations in three
unknowns plus an exogenous forcing variable, the relative credit shock. Com-
bining these three equations we can write two equations as a function of relative
per capita reserve positions of the central banks, relative consumption and the




2ρ + δ(1 + ρ)
2vδ(1 + ρ)
¸





(c − c∗) −
1
2
(d − d∗) (MM)
These two equations are depicted in Figure 1. In the pre-shock equilibrium
each of the lines in (ψ−ψ
∗), (c−c∗) space cut through the origin. Relationship
15The steady state response to is reached in the period following the shock. Consequently,
the long run steady state conditions are, with overbars representing the long run, PC =
p(h)y(h)+δB and PC





B such that nominal consumption must
equal real income, and there are no reserve ﬂows. Also, the labour-leisure trade-oﬀsm u s tb e
combined with the demand for each good given in (10) to generate (15).
19AA gives the locus of points along which relative reserves and consumptions
bring about a balance of payments equilibrium consistent with forward looking
behaviour. The locus of points given by MM reﬂects the combinations of (ψ −
ψ
∗) and (c − c∗) where there obtains equilibrium in the money market, given
(d − d∗). The greater the relative consumption position, the larger the relative
demand for money, and hence the relative reserve position between the central
banks must increase in order to increase the relative money supplies and bring
about money market equilibrium. MM is also a function of the relative credit
shock. For a positive shock to (d − d∗), Home individuals not willing to hold
all the increase in relative credit run down reserves at the central bank–it is
this immediate portfolio reallocation, and implicitly capital account deﬁcit, has
important long run eﬀects in this model.
This ﬁgure allows us to think about the role of v in inﬂuencing the results in
this model. v, which can be thought of as the inverse of the velocity of money
circulation, aﬀects the slope of AA. As the velocity of circulation decreases, and
v becomes larger, the slope of the AA schedule in absolute terms decreases.
And following a relative credit expansion in the model, there is a larger relative
consumption and smaller relative reserve response. Since the velocity of money
circulation is smaller, a larger amount of any monetary expansion is required to
achieve money market equilibrium. Consequently, reserves are seen to ﬂow less.
It is interesting also to consider how, in justifying focussing upon the real
components of the utility function in performing welfare analyses, other studies
have suggested that χ might be considered arbitrarily small. This model demon-
strates that this is not necessarily a good assumption since χ–via v–plays an
important role in aﬀecting the real variables and utility through the money de-
mand equation in this ﬁxed exchange rate model. It is, of course, still useful
to focus upon the real components of the utility function when thinking about
welfare, and can be justﬁed by arguing that money is simply being a facilitator
of consumption. The point is simply this: it might not be justiﬁed to make
arbitrary assumptions about the size of the parameter χ in a ﬁxed exchange
rate context since, in this model at least, χ itself is an important determinant of
the real variables. Finally, Figure 1 is directly comparable with the ﬂexible ex-
change rate version of this model presented in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) where
instead of the relative reserve position the nominal exchange rate features on
the vertical axis16.
Solving these equations we can calculate the response of relative per capita
variables to the unanticipated relative credit shock
ψ − ψ
∗
= ψ − ψ
∗ = −
2ρ + δ(1 + ρ)
4ρ +2 δ(1 + ρ)(1 + v)
(d − d∗) (16)
16See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), Figure 10.2, page 680.
20c − c∗ = c − c∗ =
vδ(1 + ρ)
2ρ + δ(1 + ρ)(1 + v)
(d − d∗) (17)
b = b =
2vδ(1 − n)
2ρ + δ(1+ ρ)(1 + v)
(d − d∗) (18)
In the usual way, we can use these results to calculate the impact and long-
run eﬀects on country variables. In order to focus the remainder of the discussion
however, henceforth we will restrict our attention to the case of an unexpected,
permanent credit expansion in the Home region only. Therefore we focus upon
the case where d = d>0 but d∗ = d
∗
=0 . Later we will consider the case
of sterilisation by the Foreign monetary authority, whereby d∗ = d
∗
< 0 and is
adjusted so as to sterlise completely the eﬀect on the Foreign monetary base of
the Home monetary expansion.
7 Spillovers of the Domestic Credit Shock
In this section we report the per capita eﬀect on country speciﬁc variables of the
domestic monetary expansion in both countries in both the short and long run.
We consider in turn the cases of sterilisation and nonsterilisation. We begin
with the former.
7.1 Nonsterilisation
Table 1 reports the impact and long run eﬀect on country per capita vari-
ables. Following the credit expansion in the Home country, the real interest
rate declines. That is, the expected jump in the future price level reduces the
real interest rate and causes individuals to reduce their saving and increase
consumption on impact17. This is common to both countries. However, the
consumption response is not identical on impact. As Table 1 reports, although
the per capita output response is identical in each region–given the ﬁxed ex-
change rate which does not bring about a change in relative prices–the relative
per capita consumption response, as we have seen, is positive. This is entirely
due to the forward looking nature of consumption choices in this model. As
the previous section highlighted, due to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime in place
monetary equilibrium is achieved by running down the relative reserve position
17In common with the ﬂexible exchange rate class of models, there is no liquidity eﬀect in
this model–that is, no nominal interest rate response to monetary policy changes. This can
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Figure 1: A relative Home credit expansion shifts down MM–the locus of
points depicting equilibrium in the money market. The new intersection with
AA demonstrates the relative reserve change required to maintain the ﬁxed
exchange rate and also illustrates the positive relative consumption response
due to the policy shock.
22of the Home central bank. These reserves are used to purchase assets–claims on
future Foreign output–and goods–current Foreign output–and is the process
through which the Foreign monetary base is itself expanded in the short run.
As intertemporal optimisers, Home (and Foreign) agents are aware of the future
ﬂow of resources due to their portfolio reallocation. Consequently, consumption
smoothing drives a wedge between the country speciﬁc per capita consumption
response–resulting in a current account deﬁcit at Home and a surplus abroad.
As evidence of this consumption smoothing mechanism, consider how the Home
deﬁcit on current account, y −c, is identical to the long run deviation of Home
consumption from the inital steady state, and likewise the current surplus in
the Foreign region is identical to their long run consumption decrease.
In other words, due to forward looking agents, although the output response
in each region is identical following the monetary expansion, microfoundations
demonstrate the role of the resulting net asset position in bringing about a
diﬀerential consumption response in this model–something which cannot be
asserted using the ad hoc ﬁxed exchange rate models.
Table 1 also demonstrates the long run eﬀect of the Home monetary expan-
sion. The equilibrating short run reserve ﬂows and concomitant positive net
asset position (capital account deﬁcit) immediately following the shock mean
that Home receives a ﬂow of resources through time with which they increase
their long run consumption and substitute away from production–leisure is a
normal good. The reverse happens in the Foreign region. Being obliged to
transfer resources to Home, they reduce their long run consumption and in-
crease production relative to the steady state. Since prices can change, Table 1
reports the increase in the price level and also the terms of trade reponse–the
Home good becomes relatively more expensive in the long run.
23Table 1: Home Monetary Expansion Under Fixed
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where Θ =4 ρ +2 δ(1 + ρ)(1 + v).
One feature of the model which it would be interesting to account for is the
country speciﬁc reserve response. Table 1 reports the relative per capita reserve
position in each country, which decreases as we would expect. Unfortunately,
since this model is silent on the issue of precisely who intervenes, we are unable
to make this transparent. This is clearly an unsatisfactory feature of the model
and deserves further attention.
7.2 Sterilisation
The results under the case of Foreign sterilisation of the eﬀect on its monetary
base are reported in Table 2. Sterilisation here is deﬁn e da st h ea c to ft h e
24Foreign monetary authority altering credit to leave the overall Foreign money
supply unchanged. Note, the denominator in these expressions diﬀers from that
above. Here, Ω < Θ. As a result of the sterilisation, there is no increase
in Foreign per capita consumption on impact–sterilising the monetary base
means money market equilibrium, given no liquidity eﬀect, is achieved with no
change in Foreign consumption. However, Home continues to enjoy an increase
in consumption on impact. Infact, the increase in Home consumption, Home
and Foreign output, along with the decrease in the real interest rate, are all
greater than in our previous case of no sterilisation. Here there is no increase in
the Foreign monetary base and therefore no increase in Foreign output through
the Foreign consumption channel. Instead, the increase in Foreign output comes
about entirely through the demand from the Home region.
The intuition for these results is that the Foreign credit contraction serves to
augment the credit expansion by the Home authority in terms of the net asset
position of the Home residents–which is even larger due to the sterilisation.
Thus, Home consumption in a forward looking manner, increases by more on
impact which itself requires a larger fall in the real interest rate and a larger
increase in Home and Foreign output on impact.
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where Ω =2 ρ + δ(1 + ρ)(1 + 2v).
Thus, the Home net asset position and the change in the relative reserve
position in the case of sterilisation are unambiguously larger than in the no
sterilisation case. As a result, all of the long run variables, except the increase
in the long run price level, are unambiguously larger due to the short run capitial
account deﬁcit. Home enjoys greater long run consumption and leisure while
Foreign residents reduce consumption more and increase their work eﬀort and
output.
7.3 Comparison with Flexible Exchange Rate Models
In the ﬁrst generation NOEM models, exchange rate depreciation in the face
of a monetary shock plays the Keynesian expenditure switching role whereby
26the relative price change increases the demand for the product of the country
undergoing the monetary expansion. The result of this is that agents in the
region in which the expansion occurs, for values of ρ > 1, run a current account
surplus, or a deﬁcit for ρ < 1. In the former case, the surplus occurs because
the increase in output is temporary. Forward looking agents wish to smooth
their consumption through time, and this they achieve by consuming less upon
impact than the increase in output, saving the rest via the current account
surplus. Latterly, a deﬁcit occurs on impact since the goods are compliments.
Thus, in the ﬂexible exchange rate case the overall current account and
capital account position sums to zero. Hence, under the assumption that the
internationally traded goods are substitutes, the current account surplus implies
an identical positive net foreign asset position which agents use to increase
consumption in the future. This current account surplus under ﬂexible exchange
rates contrasts with our result for the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t ec a s et h a tac u r r e n t
account deﬁcit obtains upon impact for all values of ρ.T h i sr e s u l ti sd r i v e nb y
the fact that in this model the change in the foreign exchange reserves at the
central bank drives a wedge between the current account and capital account of
the private sector. Consider for example the balance of payments for this ﬁxed
exchange rate model.
Balance of Payments Accounts:
PHYH − PC current account surplus
+ − B capital account surplus
––––––––––––––






0) overall BoP surplus
Given the ﬁxed exchange rate, the portfolio reallocation following the mon-
etary shock results in an accumulation of Foreign assets, given by a posi-
tive B. Forward looking agents aware of this future ﬂow of income wish to
smooth this consumption ﬂow through time, and run a current account deﬁcit,
PHYH − PC <0. The balance of payments position has been ﬁnanced by run-
ning down reserves at the central bank. This brings out an important contrast
between the ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate models, and demonstrates an im-
portant channel often ignored in discussions of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes in
the second generation NOEM models.
8W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Of course, one of the advantages of the NOEM literature is that the models
themselves, based on explicit utility functions, suggest a natural welfare metric
with which policy interdependence can be evaluated. In this section we proceed
by focussing upon the real component of the utility function–the consumption
27and output components. Using the results presented in the previous section we
can caculate the present discounted ﬂow of utility through time for Home and
Foreign agents given diﬀerent parameter values. In what follows we consider a
unit credit expansion by the Home country and allow the within period elasticity
of substitution, ρ,t ov a r y 18. We assume δ =0 .06 which is equivalent to setting
β ≈ 0.94.W e s e t θ =6which is equivalent to a mark up of around 20%.
We also set the inverse of velocity, v =1and consider various country sizes.
Given the functional form we assume in the utility function and these additional
parameter restrictions, these results are comparable to those reported for the
ﬂexible exchange rate case by Tille (2001).
Table 3 reports the welfare implications of the unit Home credit expansion
under the cases of no sterilisation by Foreign and then under sterilisation. The
Table also reports, for comparison, the ﬂexible exchange rate spillovers from
Tille (2001). Consider the upper part of the Table which demonstrates the role
of consumption substitutability and country size in the propagation of shocks.
Note how, regardless of ρ the Home country always beneﬁts from the monetary
expansion. That is, with the exchange rate ﬁxed–thus imparting no expendi-
ture switching eﬀect of monetary policy through the exchange rate–the Home
country always beneﬁts from the expansion due to the porﬁlio reallocation which
is required to bring about short run equilibrium. In fact, as the goods become
worse substitutes, the Home country beneﬁts more from the expansion, which
contrasts with the ﬂexible exchange rate case, where Home welfare is increasing
with ρ–opposite to the results under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
18A unit, d =1 , expansion in credit does not accord well with our assertion that the shocks
should be ”small” for our solution to hold. However, this ﬁgure is chosen for simplicity, and
the values of spillovers for shocks can be calculated for, say, a 1% domestic credit expansion
by multiplying the ﬁgures presented by 10−2. The unit expansion assumption in the ﬂexible
exchange rate case was also utilised in Tille (2001) with which we compare our model.
28table 3: welfare results under no-sterilisation
ρ 123456789
FIXED
No Steril. n =0 .25 u 1.07 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.79
n =0 .5 u 0.74 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55
n =0 .75 u 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
n =0 .25 u* -0.25 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15
n =0 .5 u* -0.58 -0.47 -0.44 -0.42 -0.41 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.39
n =0 .75 u* -0.90 -0.75 -0.70 -0.67 -0.65 -0.64 -0.63 -0.63 -0.62
FIXED
Steril. n =0 .25 u 1.88 1.60 1.51 1.46 1.42 1.41 1.39 1.38 1.37
n =0 .5 u 1.26 1.07 1.01 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92
n =0 .75 u 0.64 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46
n =0 .25 u* -0.62 -0.53 -0.50 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45
n =0 .5 u* -1.24 -1.06 -1.00 -0.96 -0.94 -0.93 -0.92 -0.91 -0.91
n =0 .75 u* -1.86 -1.59 -1.50 -1.45 -1.42 -1.40 -1.38 -1.37 -1.36
FLOATING
n =0 .5 u -0.33 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20
n =0 .5 u* 0.50 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.03
Moreover, Table 3 makes clear that there are negative spillovers to the For-
eign region for all parameter values reported. However, the negative spillover
is increasing in the size of the Home country. Since the per capita negative
net asset position taken on by the Foreign country is proportional to the size
of the Home region, as Foreign becomes larger, the long run burden of making
payments to the Home region becomes, in per capita terms, smaller. As a re-
sult, the Foreign region, when suﬃciently large, will beneﬁt from the monetary
expansion which has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on welfare as the economy is pushed
towards the eﬃcient production level in the short run. The general expression
for the value of n for which there is exactly no welfare spillover on the Foreign
country is
n =
2v[δ(1 + ρ)+ρ]+2 ρ + δ(1 + ρ)
2vθ[δ(1 + ρ)+1+2 ρ]
which, for the parameter values utilised in the above calibration, suggests
n ≈ 0.12 for ρ =1and n ≈ 0.16 for ρ =9 . Thus, the boundary at which Foreign
29overall utility does not change for a Home monetary expansion occurs when the
Home country is less than one ﬁfth of the overall size of the two economies, and
Foreign therefore beneﬁts in welfare terms so long as the Home country is very
small.
As reported in Table 3, sterilisation by Foreign is a beggar-thy-self policy.
That is, although the Foreign region can ensure no impact on its monetary
base through sterilisation, in doing so Foreign gains no utility from a short run
consumption bonus, and in fact takes on a larger liability due to the capital ﬂows.
Consequently, Foreign increases long run ouput and reduces consumption more
which means, for any given monetary expansion by Home, the negative spillovers
are greater. And the spillover is always negative under Foreign sterilisation,
regardless of the Home region size. Thus, a central bank not playing by the
rules-of-the-game, if you like, in this symmetric ﬁx is instigating a beggar-thyself
policy at all times.
Of course, there is one important feature of welfare that this analysis is
unable to account for. The fact that the Foreign monetary authority has ac-
cumulated large reserves of the Home currency means at some point in the
future the Foreign monetary authority could run down these reserves to achieve
a consumption boom. Thus, this analysis is unable to account for the long-run
welfare implications of changes in reserves at the central banks. And although
this cannot be explicitly considered in this model due to the restrictions required
in solving the model, it is likely to be an important feature in real world con-
siderations. For one thing, following the accumulation of reserves, the Foreign
central bank is likely to be able to expand monetary policy in the future more
within the ﬁx before pushing up against its reserve constraint.
9C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we develop a model analogous to the ﬁxed exchange rate ad hoc
two country model of Mundell which complements the ﬂexible exchange rate
NOEM models. The main results of this work can be summarised as being
fourfold:
First, stock implications of portfolio adjustments by private agents following
a credit shock play an important role in the spillover of credit shocks across
countries participating in a symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate regime. These wel-
fare spillovers are likely to be, following a positive credit shock in one region,
negative–which stands in stark contrast to the implied spillover in the ad hoc
v e r s i o no ft h em o d e l .
Second, one consequence of a model built upon explicit microeconomic foun-
dations is that the region experiencing a positive credit shock runs a current
account deﬁcit in smoothing consumption through time. This contrasts with
the ﬂexible exchange rate NOEM models in which the region where a monetary
expansion occurs runs a current account surplus or deﬁcit depending upon the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The result for this ﬁxed exchange rate
model obtains due to the role of foreign exchange reserves allowing a capital
30account deﬁcit on the balance of payments to be achieved at the expense of
oﬃcial reserve holdings at the central bank, and consequently forward looking
agents run a current account deﬁcit by way of consumption smoothing.
Third, the symmetric Foreign money supply expansion comes about thor-
ough two channels: (i) The portfolio reallocation mechanism emphasised in the
ad hoc models. (ii) The relative consumption and therefore current account
channel which cannot be identiﬁed within the ad hoc framework.
Finally, sterilisation by the monetary authority not instigating the expan-
sionary policy turns out to be a beggar thy-self policy.
We note here two particular drawbacks to this analysis however:
First, since our model is unable to distinguish between precisely which cen-
tral bank is intervening, a potentially important feature of the real world is left
unexplored. Indeed, if the intervention is shared between the central banks, it
would be useful to be precise about the nature of this sharing arrangement. It
is possible that this could carry strong implications for the robustness of the
results in this paper.
Second, the reserve diﬀerential which occurs following the Home credit shock
implies that in per capita terms the Foreign residents hold a greater quantity of
reserves than Home–in reserve terms, a positive net asset position for Foreign
agents. This diﬀerential is a result of the nonstationarity of the net asset and
reserve positions of the central banks following a shock in this class of models.
Clearly, a more satisfactory dynamic model in which the central banks return
their relative reserve position to their initial position would account for the
longer run reserve requirements of participating in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
This dynamic response, through the balance of payments equation (and, for
simplicity, holding the net asset position of the private sector constant) implies
a relative consumption response in favour of Foreign since reserves are a claim on
future Home output. One reason for our startling welfare results must therefore
be that we are unable to account for the long run relative reserve position of
the central banks which are themselves an asset of the country involved.
There are clearly a number of lines of research which require further thought,
and suggest themselves to future research. However, it is hoped that this
framework oﬀers an alternative view of ﬁxed exchange rate modeling within
the NOEM literature. Finally, an important and novel approach of this paper
has been to spell out precisely the nature of a symmetric ﬁxed exchange rate
regime in a microfounded model. This framework could be modiﬁed in future
work to allow researchers to explore other important issues relating to the ﬁxing
of exchange rates in microfounded models.
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